what can other countries do to help venezuela

The Fabulous 5: How Foreign Actors Prop upwards the Maduro Regime in Venezuela

CSIS Briefs

October 19, 2020

"The Venezuelan crisis long ago stopped existence a local issue. It became a regional issue and information technology is at present an effect with diverse global implications. Agreement the influence and interests of other countries in Venezuela is a necessary condition to finding the style for a successful transition to republic in the country and a route to lasting stability in the region."

—Francisco Santos, Colombian Ambassador to the United states of america

The Event

The Maduro regime would not be in power today were it non for the back up it receives from its five central allies: Russian federation, China, Cuba, Iran, and Turkey. These states provide varying degrees of financial, diplomatic, and intelligence back up to the Venezuelan government. Some of these states have maintained close ties with Venezuela since the early years of the Hugo Chávez presidency. Others have emerged every bit new lifelines among mounting international force per unit area. Russia, China, Cuba, Iran, and Turkey each have distinct fiscal and geopolitical motivations for propping up the Maduro regime and thus merit specific and nuanced policy approaches.

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Executive Summary

Russia and Venezuela accept a longstanding financial, political, and diplomatic partnership. With picayune regard for commercial risk, Russia continues to human activity as a lender of final resort, aid Venezuela circumvent oil sanctions, fuel disinformation campaigns, and provide military supplies to the Maduro authorities.

Mainland china is owed by Venezuela at least $20 billion in loans established before 2017. It continues to be a stiff—albeit placidity—supporter of the Maduro regime and has significantly reduced its commercial forays into Venezuela in recent years.

Islamic republic of iran and Venezuela accept had a symbolic and heavily rhetorical partnership since the early years of the Chávez administration. In contempo months, they have rekindled their partnership, finding mutual basis every bit two states that are deeply isolated on the earth stage.

Cuba is existentially dependent on Venezuela merely as well continues to have tremendous sway over the Maduro regime'southward intelligence apparatus, the Venezuelan armed services, and the authorities's ideological rhetoric. The ideological linkages betwixt the two countries run deep and emerged at the beginning of the Chávez administration.

Turkey is a relatively new partner for the regime and has emerged as a facilitator of Venezuela'due south illicit gilded merchandise. This partnership is the most unusual of the v given that Turkey maintains constructive diplomatic relations with the United States.

The United States, the European Marriage, the Lima Grouping, the Venezuelan acting government, and others who seek to facilitate a democratic transition should sympathize the nuances and historical context of these countries' interest in Venezuela.

Policy Recommendations

For the United States Government

• Denote and publicizeindictments confronting Russian citizens who violate U.Southward. law in their business dealings with Venezuela.


• Create and update a public online database of Russian war machine and diplomatic personnel nowadays in Venezuela to promote transparency and accountability.


• Publicly rail Russian and Iranian ships on the way to or from Venezuela. Open a public website that provides name, cargo, and navigational data for all known vessels used by the Maduro authorities and its allies to circumvent sanctions.

• The United States and other allies of the Venezuelan interim government should maintain pressure on Iran—including civil forfeiture and targeted sanctions for entities that are helping the Maduro regime evade sanctions.


• Assure the Russian and Chinese governments that all contracts approved by a democratically elected National Assembly should exist honored by the Venezuelan interim regime and subsequent democratic governments in Venezuela. Contracts not canonical by the National Assembly will be honored depending on the posture and actions of these states leading up to and during a transition.


• Leverage the human relationship between Turkey, the United States, and European union countries (especially Germany) to pressure President Erdogan to play a constructive role in resolving Venezuela'south political crunch.

For the Interim Government and its Other Allies

• Issue a Lima Group announcement noting that unofficialparamilitary groups (such as the Russian Wagner group) operating in Venezuelapractise not enjoy diplomatic immunity or protection.

• Engage with China via other partner nations aside from the United states of america, such as Chile and Brazil, which maintain effective relations with China.
  • These discussions should focus on the potential role for Red china nether a democratic government in Venezuela and reiterate the regional reputational costs of China's continued support for the Maduro regime.
  
  
  • This engagement effort could be coordinated by a working group of independent experts from the Venezuelan diaspora, including economists, diplomats, and humanitarian relief experts.

• Countries that maintain constructive diplomatic relations with Cuba, such as Canada, United mexican states, and Spain, should brand a renewed and coordinated try to engage the Cubans on the issue of Venezuela.


• The Venezuelan interim government and its international allies could hold on strategic assurances to the Cubans in case of a political transition. These could include, for case:
  • A commitment to maintain the ALBA-1 cable

A plan to maintain date with the Cubans on specific aspects of reconstruction, such as public health.

Assay

I. Russian federation

There appears to exist no intuitive reason for Russia to take an economic or security involvement in Venezuela. The countries are 7,000 miles apart and share niggling historical or cultural affinities. Venezuela'southward main assets are oil and gas, of which Russian federation has plenty. And yet, Russia has established itself every bit ane of the about important partners of the Maduro government. Betwixt 2004 and 2020, the Russian Embassy in Caracas grew five-fold. For Vladimir Putin, this partnership is part of a geostrategic effort to counter what he has described equally a unipolar earth order. For Nicolás Maduro, the partnership with Russia is essential. With piffling regard for commercial or financial risk, Russia acts every bit a lender of last resort, helps Venezuela circumvent oil sanctions, fuels disinformation campaigns, and provides military supplies to the Maduro authorities.

Russia and Venezuela's strategic partnership emerged in the early on years of the Chávez presidency, as Putin sought to counter U.South. interests in the region and re-establish Russia's prominence on the globe phase. Though Russia had historic ties to the Castro authorities in Cuba, Venezuela quickly emerged every bit an obvious partner for this endeavor. Chávez had, since the beginning of his presidency, challenged the United States' influence in the region. Though Chávez met with Putin iii times in the first few years of his presidency, the relationship strengthened tremendously after 2004. By this point, Chávez was starting time to reap the benefits of an unprecedented oil bonanza, and he brought several Russian oil companies into the mix. Chávez had also started cultivating the anti-Usa Bolivarian Brotherhood for the Peoples of Our America (Alianza Bolivariana para las Américas, ALBA). The brotherhood, organized in 2004, envisioned a regional economic integration of the Americas based on social welfare, disinterestedness and mutual economic assistance instead of a merchandise liberalization model. The ALBA diplomatically supported Russia in key conflicts, including the Georgian war (2008), the 2015 annexation of Crimea, and the Syrian conflict.

Oil/Energy/Mining

The energy sector is the centerpiece of Caracas's relationship with the Kremlin. Beginning in the early 2000s, peak Russian energy firms, including Rosneft (partially owned by the Russian government), Lukoil, Surgutneftegas, and Gazprom, established ties with the Venezuelan state oil visitor, Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA), and eventually created a joint venture to drill for heavy crude oil in the Orinoco River bowl. Most of these companies sold their shares to Rosneft, which, despite increasing financial chance, continued to sink billions of dollars into Venezuela. Rosneft, under the leadership of Igor Sechin, invested $9 billion into Venezuelan oil and gas projects between 2010 and 2015 and has yet to break fifty-fifty. These projects produced far less than originally projected due to chronic equipment shortages, a lack of technical personnel and, of course, corruption. In 2015, for instance, Rosneft internal auditors noted that PDVSA could not account for a $700 million hole in the balance sheet of one of their articulation ventures.

In July 2016, Maduro signed a series of agreements with Igor Sechin, the CEO of Rosneft, to expand oil product and cooperation.
EDERICO PARRA/AFP via Getty Images

Rosneft later became the chief vehicle through which PDVSA could circumvent U.Southward. sanctions. In 2019, Rosneft handled over a tertiary of Venezuelan crude, bringing it to markets such as Republic of india and Prc at deeply discounted rates. When Rosneft itself was sanctioned in February and March of 2020, information technology transferred its Venezuela operations to a separate Russian state-owned entity. The Russian government at present controls multiple oil fields and holds a lien on 49.nine precent of PDVSA's U.S.-based subsidiary, Citgo.

Military

Venezuela and Russia have also maintained a strong military partnership. Along with other members of the ALBA alliance, Chávez offered to let Russia apply a Venezuelan military base in La Orchila, an island in the Caribbean. Beginning in the Chávez years, Russian federation sold Venezuela billions in military equipment, including tanks, fighter jets, and small arms. While many of the purchases involved advance payments in oil, every bit of 2019, Venezuela owes Russia at to the lowest degree $ten billion for fighter jets it purchased between 2009 and 2014. The ii countries too reportedly established a factory in Venezuela to produce Kalashnikov rifles, as well every bit a facility to train Venezuelan pilots to fly Russian-made helicopters.

Just equally Maduro faced increasing pressure, Putin underscored his support through symbolic military gestures largely aimed at irritating the United States. In December 2018, Putin temporarily sent ii nuclear bombers to Venezuela. Three months later, two Russian military planes arrived in Caracas bearing troops and equipment. Furthermore, the Kremlin's involvement in Venezuela fifty-fifty includes semi-state groups that requite Russia plausible deniability. In 2019, in that location were reports that a private Russian mercenary grouping had entered Venezuela via Cuba to protect Nicolás Maduro. The presence of such groups farther complicates the delicate security situation during a transition, specially given that Russia would be quick to disavow these groups—as it did in Syria—when and if something went wrong.

Disinformation/ Repression

Russian federation's support extends far beyond the energy and military sectors. For case, Russian businessmen helped Maduro create Venezuela'south oil-backed cryptocurrency, the Petro. When the Petro was launched, the only international financial institution willing to finance it was a Russian bank. Russian media outlets, like Russia Today (RT) and Sputnik, consistently publish pro-Maduro disinformation. Some disinformation campaigns in Venezuela take reportedly been traced back to the Internet Inquiry Agency, the aforementioned troll mill accused of intervening in the 2016 United States' presidential election.

II. China^one

In 2006, belatedly president Hugo Chávez declared that Venezuela and China were on the path to edifice "a strategic alliance with the strength of the Great Wall." The two countries had just signed another trade agreement through which Cathay would buy oil and refined fuels from Venezuela. In return, China would back up Venezuela's bid to join the Un Security Council.

Drawing parallels between Mao Zedong and his own credo of twenty-first century socialism, Chávez had, since early in his presidency, courted China every bit an alternative to the United States' political and economical hegemony in the region. The Chinese, according to Chávez, offered more flexible loans "without strings attached." Indeed, unlike traditional Western lenders, People's republic of china mitigated political hazard in many of its state-to-state loans, for case by collateralizing them through parallel contracts nether which the loan recipient would evangelize bolt to Chinese importers, including oil and gas companies such as Sinopec. This allowed Mainland china to secure the commodities it needed to supply its growing economy. By 2015, China had loaned Venezuela more $64 billion dollars, primarily through 2 of its largest policy banks.

The two countries cooperated in a range of sectors, from petroleum, to transportation infrastructure, mining, agronomics, manufacturing, and telecommunications. China ultimately built and launched three Venezuelan satellites and associated ground control and communications infrastructure. In addition, Prc signed commitments to build 20,000 homes, a $7.5 billion high-speed track, and Latin America'south biggest rice processing establish. Many of these efforts stalled due to scarlet tape, corruption, and dwindling technical expertise inside Venezuela. This would prove to exist a common theme in Venezuela's partnerships with other countries, such as Islamic republic of iran. The railway remains unbuilt and the rice found, which involved millions of dollars in bribes, currently produces at less than 1 percent of capacity.

President Xi Jinping and Nicolas Maduro signed a $iv billion oil deal in July 2014.
LEO RAMIREZ/AFP via Getty Images​

After Chávez died and the price of oil plummeted in 2014, Chinese lenders became much more cautious. They recognized the political hazard with a government prone to economical mismanagement. While President Eleven Jinping continued to cooperate with the Maduro regime, financing was channeled primarily through joint ventures. Many of these ventures were specifically designed to boost Venezuela's oil production since the country was barely producing enough to repay its oil-backed loans.

Whereas Venezuela received 64 percent of China'southward loans to Latin America in 2012, past 2016 information technology received only 10 percent and about no Chinese investment.

China's electric current posture in Venezuela is misunderstood. They are still owed $xx billion of the more than $64 billion they have loaned to the country since 2008. But that corporeality is small-scale relative to China's $1 trillion sovereign wealth fund, and non enough to motivate China to facilitate a solution that would strengthen Washington's position, U.S.-style republic, and free markets in the region, particularly in the context of increasingly tense U.S.-China relations. Chinese officials have held informal conversations with interim president Guaidó'due south government, which allow them to maintain channels of communication with the opposition and persuade them to honor China's contracts if and when a transition occurs. But Chinese officials argue that the Venezuelan military still supports Maduro. Therefore, the Chinese believe that the chances of seeing a political transition in Venezuela are yet low and operate their foreign policy accordingly.

China continues to be a strong—admitting relatively tranquillity—ally to the Maduro regime. Most recently, the 2 countries negotiated another grace period for an upcoming debt obligation—this time for a $iii billion payment originally scheduled for this yr. Despite stiff U.Southward. sanctions, People's republic of china has connected to import Venezuelan oil, at times concealing this trade through send-to-ship transfers. In 2019, China unsurprisingly vetoed a U.Southward.-backed resolution in the United Nations calling for free and fair presidential elections. The Maduro authorities has too relied on Communist china for disinformation campaigns and other repressive technology, including a widely criticized national ID card that tin can exist used to allocate government assist to those who are politically loyal to the regime. And, though Cathay has not sold Venezuela military equipment in two years, some of the armored vehicles it provided during the Chávez presidency were used to repress protests in 2019. In the context of the current Covid-19 pandemic, Communist china has been a cardinal lifeline for the Maduro regime. It has sent medical personnel and at least six flights with a total of 300 tons of medical supplies, including quick tests, facemasks, and other personal protective equipment.

Ultimately, though China continues to support the Maduro regime, it occupies a distinct space from Russia, which has been far more willing to accept on large financial risks to continue supporting the Maduro regime. Regardless of its electric current political stance, Mainland china could certainly play a big role in Venezuela's economical reconstruction, as interim president Guaidó has argued.

III. Cuba

Since Hugo Chávez's rise to power, Republic of cuba and Venezuela accept had a shut relationship of common benefit. Different other allies—Russia, China, Turkey and Iran—with whom Venezuela maintains more commercial and transactional relationships, Cuba is an ideological ally that, to this day, still plays a strong informational role in Venezuela's domestic and foreign affairs.

Cuba'southward Apprentice

Fidel Castro's outset meaningful visit to Caracas dates back to 1959, when he tried to spread the Cuban Revolution amidst the masses and throughout the region. But it wasn't until Hugo Chávez visited Cuba in 1994, after being pardoned for his role in an attempted coup, that Castro became Chávez's mentor. The two shared a similar vision of a Latin American bloc united in opposition to the Washington Consensus and deeply rooted in Revolutionary Marxism. Castro and Chávez built a shut friendship; in the first five years of Chávez'southward presidency, they visited each other at least 15 times—exchanges during which the outset waves of Cubans were sent to Venezuela.

Fidel Castro visited Venezuela in 2000—his beginning official land visit to the land in well-nigh 40 years
JUAN BARRETO/AFP via Getty Images​

But this and then-called "padre-hermano" relationship between the two heads of state consisted of more than just a mentorship in political ideology. In 2000, the countries signed an oil agreement in which Venezuela agreed to export 53,000 barrels of oil per day for 5 years—a third of Cuban consumption—and in return, Republic of cuba provided Venezuela with generic medicine, vaccines, medical equipment and treatments. The pact was doubled in i year and by 2003, Republic of cuba owed Venezuela $190 million. This commutation continued throughout Chávez'southward presidency. By 2011, Cuba imported 61 pct of its full oil supply form Venezuela.

As the relationship grew stronger, Chávez began adapting the Cuban model to Venezuela. By 2004, 20,000 Cubans that worked for the state had arrived in Venezuela to implement literacy, sports training, and healthcare programs (including authorities programs such as Misión Barrio Adentro ).ⁱⁱ By 2015, an estimated 40,000 Cuban technical personnel including nurses, instructors, physicians, teachers, and sports trainers as well as intelligence, security, and military officers had come up into Venezuela. With this progressive occupation came tremendous ideological influence and the foundation of an entire intelligence network at the service of the Cuban regime.

Venezuela besides helped Republic of cuba dramatically increment its telecommunications capabilities by edifice a fiber telecommunications submarine cable, the ALBA 1, aptly named after Chávez and Castro's ALBA Alliance.

Cuban Influence in Venezuela Today

Later on Chávez, and later Castro, died, Cuba and Venezuela's relationship sustained itself more through a mutual need for self-preservation than through any sort of personal relationship between Maduro and the Cuban regime. Cuba continues to depend on Venezuela for oil—receiving an average of 105,000 barrels per twenty-four hours of Venezuelan crude every bit recently every bit May of this twelvemonth. Furthermore, Venezuela nonetheless controls a large part of Cuba'south communications arrangement and information technology is expected to exercise so for another 18 years, which is the amount of time ALBA-1 is expected to continue operating.

On the other hand, Cuba is an integral chemical element of the organization of social command and repression that the Maduro regime uses to stay in power. Cubans go along to provide intelligence support and monitor domestic and internal military activities, primarily through the Directorate General of Military Counterintelligence (Dirección General de Contrainteligencia Militar, DGCIM). To protect the authorities, these security forces imprison and torture political dissidents and civilians protesters. Since 2014, Human Rights Sentinel has reported more 380 cases of homo rights abuses by the security forces and 31 cases of torture. Cuban officials reportedly play a primal office, not but by helping to plan these operations, merely by training Venezuelan officials in interrogation techniques, including torture methodology. Based on their own experiences, Republic of cuba also helps Venezuela develop and execute constructive disinformation campaigns.

Cubans continue to provide intelligence support and monitor domestic and internal armed services activities, primarily through the Directorate General of Military Counterintelligence.

Cuba is so dependent on Venezuela that the possibility of a political transition at that place represents an existential threat to the Castro regime. Information technology is non in Republic of cuba'due south best interest for Venezuela to accomplish a negotiated solution and restore its democracy. Accordingly, Cuba exerts significant influence on the Maduro regime'south security apparatus and has arguably done more than any other land to secure Maduro's grasp on power.

IV. Iranⁱⁱⁱ

Iran made headlines throughout the summer for continuing to support the Maduro government, primarily by aircraft fuel to Venezuela amid chronic shortages. This support raised concerns in the Usa and throughout the Western Hemisphere regarding a strengthening brotherhood between two nations that accept consistently harbored anti-U.South. sentiment. On August 14, the United States seized two fuel tankers jump for Venezuela carrying ane.12 million barrels of gasoline. The move came as the UN Security Council overwhelmingly rejected the Trump administration's resolution to indefinitely extend the global artillery embargo on Iran.

Iran has consistently defied the Us' maximum pressure entrada to oust the Maduro regime and restore republic in Venezuela. The growing partnership between the two countries is worrisome but should be understood in the grand scheme of Iran-Venezuela relations.

A Longstanding Human relationship

Every bit policymakers consider responses to Islamic republic of iran and Venezuela's partnership, they would be best served to recall that the ii countries have had a diplomatic and commercial relationship for decades—one that was much stronger and more alarming during the Chávez presidency than it is today. This relationship has often generated provocative headlines while failing to deliver on tangible achievements.

The 2 countries, both founding members of the Arrangement of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), accept had a bilateral relationship since before Iran's 1979 revolution. When the Shah was overthrown in 1979, Venezuela was one of the first countries to recognize the new Iranian regime. For the next 2 decades, the countries' collaboration was limited to the oil industry.

This relationship intensified, however, when Chávez became president. Between 2001 and 2013, at that place were dozens of diplomatic visits between the Chávez and the Khatami and Ahmadinejad administrations. The two countries signed an estimated 300 agreements of varying importance and value, ranging from working on low-income housing developments to cement plants and car factories. They fifty-fifty established a articulation development fund and opened a development bank nether the structure of Iran'southward Export Development Bank (EDBI). Past 2012, Iran'south investments and loans in Venezuela were estimated to be between $15 and $20 billion.

Nigh of these initiatives petered out earlier they were completed. A auto factory, which Chávez claimed would manufacture 25,000 units per year, produced fewer than two,000 units in 2014. A cement factory, which was announced in 2005, did not start production until 2012. Some of the initiatives reportedly were likewise used to facilitate illicit activities. In 2009, for example, Turkish officials seized 22 Iranian containers leap for Venezuela which were labeled as "tractor parts" but reportedly independent materials for an explosives lab. The Export Evolution Bank of Iran (EDBI) was sanctioned by the Usa and the European Union for alleged linkages to Iran's nuclear weapons programme.

Ch á vez'south Vision for Iran in Latin America

The relationship was symbiotic. With little actual investment, Iran'due south development efforts inside Venezuela boosted Chávez's image and advanced his anti-imperialist agenda throughout the region. For Iran, Venezuela became a beachhead for diplomatic and commercial expansion into Latin America. Chávez ushered the Iranians to his regional allies, opening up channels of advice that led to agreements between Ahmadinejad and the governments of Ecuador, Republic of bolivia, and Nicaragua. As Iran faced increasing financial isolation due to U.S. sanctions, Venezuela—through the ALBA alliance—helped open up vital trade links.

Iran and Venezuela'southward Growing Partnership

The relationship betwixt Iran and Venezuela began to dwindle afterwards Chávez died in 2013. After all, the ii countries share few areas of natural commonality. Among plummeting oil prices, Ahmadinejad'south successor, President Rouhani, stopped prioritizing Venezuela. Aside from a few bilateral agreements of questionable heft, Maduro had generally been unable to maintain the sort of relationship with Iran that Chávez envisioned. To the extent in that location has been a human relationship in recent years, it was driven primarily past links betwixt the function of the Iranian supreme leader and a handful of senior Venezuelan military leaders.

Iran has provided Venezuela with at to the lowest degree ii.35 million barrels of gasoline and refining components since May of this yr.

But this human relationship has been rekindled in recent months as both countries face up mounting force per unit area from the international customs. The crux of this partnership consists of evading U.Due south. sanctions, primarily through shipments of fuel and refining materials to Venezuela, where an acute gasoline shortage has paralyzed food distribution and internal transportation. Iran shipped one.53 million barrels of gasoline to Venezuela in June. A second shipment was confiscated by the United States Department of Justice on Baronial 14. In early Oct, three more Iranian tankers docked at Venezuelan ports, and some other vessel reportedly loaded one.9 one thousand thousand barrels of Venezuelan crude for the National Iranian Oil Company.

Iran likewise attempted to aid Venezuela restart a major refinery—reportedly in substitution for payment in golden bars—only the refinery shut downwardly once again less than 2 months later. Any efforts by Islamic republic of iran to increment Venezuela's refining capacity volition hinge primarily on the countries' power to carry out technical upgrades without delays, abuse, and mismanagement.

In the by, Iran has demonstrated an interest in providing short-range missiles to its ideological partners, too as armed drones and kits that can be used to improve existing rocket systems. There is a possibility that Venezuela is interested in purchasing missiles, equally was recently reported by Colombian intelligence, but the status of this try is uncertain. Information technology is unclear whether Iran is set up to provide these missiles or how Venezuela would pay them.

V. Turkey

On Baronial 18, Turkish Strange Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu visited Venezuela and brought with him much-needed medical help to fight Covid-nineteen, including more than two dozen ventilators and thousands of testing kits and masks. This gesture represents a growing partnership betwixt ii countries that, less than a decade agone, barely exchanged ambassadors. This partnership provides the international community an opportunity to pressure the Venezuelan regime through Ankara.

An Unlikely Friendship

For decades, Venezuela and Turkey's relationship was generally deadening, salve for a few diplomatic scuffles. In 2005, for example, the Venezuelan National Associates passed a resolution recognizing the Armenian genocide, eliciting the anger of Ankara. Then, during the Arab spring, Chávez staunchly supported Bashar al-Assad and Muammar Qaddafi—a position diametrically opposed to Turkish President Erdogan's, who pushed for a government alter in Syria and supported war machine operations in Libya. This led to a menses of diplomatic tension between the two countries.

Yet, afterward the July 2016 failed insurrection try in Turkey, President Erdogan (whose supporters claim significant U.S. involvement) adopted an anti-Western and anti-American foreign policy opinion. That is where he and Maduro found mutual ground. Maduro, who was quick to support Erdogan during the insurgence, met with him in October 2016 in Istanbul. Soon afterwards, Turkish Airlines initiated direct flights to Caracas and, in only 2 years, bilateral merchandise betwixt the ii countries tripled in volume. The 2 heads of land have met on three occasions since 2016, and in that location have been some other half a dozen high-level meetings between the Maduro government and the Turkish regime.

Venezuela ranks lower in Erdogan's strange policy priorities than other issues—such as Turkey's military interest in Syria, northern Iraq, and Libya. Nevertheless, Erdogan and Maduro share a stiff personal human relationship and bilateral relations with Venezuela are important to Turkey in the broader context of Erdogan's foreign policy. The relationship fits into Erdogan's sustained bulldoze in contempo years to assert Turkish independence in all aspects of foreign policy and information technology derives strength from Erdogan's perception that the two leaders are facing similar threats. For example, when Juan Guaidó was sworn in as acting president of Venezuela, the Turkish media compared the episode to the July 2016 coup attempt in Turkey, and Erdogan called on "[his] brother" to stay potent.

Turkey Is an Economical Lifeline to Venezuela

For Turkey, Venezuela is a peripheral player of relatively little geopolitical or economic significance. By contrast, for Venezuela, Turkey is an economical and political lifeline amid increasingly suffocating sanctions and diplomatic isolation. In 2018, post-obit sanctions targeting Venezuela's gold industry, the Maduro government announced that it would move its aureate refinery operations from Switzerland to Turkey. The same year, Turkey emerged as a major importer of Venezuelan non-budgetary gold, importing around $900 million worth of the metal betwixt Jan and November.

The gold merchandise occurred through a network of shell companies, some of which were presumably prepare for Venezuela to trade gold for food. At least one scheme involved Alex Saab, a government confidant who is currently in custody in Cape verde. Saab bought gold from so-called artisan miners in southern Venezuela and sold it to the Central Bank of Venezuela. The Key Bank so exported the gold to Turkey and with the proceeds, financed the purchase of consumer goods. Saab, through his Istanbul-based shipper Mulberry Proje Yatirim, bought the food in Turkey at an overvalued price and so imported it back to Venezuela for Maduro's Local Committees for Supply and Product (Comité Local de Abastecimiento y Producción, Handclapping) program.

Back in Venezuela, Turkish products became a staple in Venezuelan supermarkets. Last year, Turkey exported $131.6 million worth of goods to Venezuela—78 percent of which consisted of consumer goods such equally cereal, milk products, and soap. Just five years ago, before Maduro and Erdogan'southward commencement contiguous meeting, Turkish exports to Venezuela totaled just $eighteen.7 one thousand thousand.

Maduro besides found in Turkey a reliable buyer for Venezuelan oil in the aftermath of U.S sanctions. Increasingly cut off from international markets, Maduro saw yet another opportunity to capitalize on his shut human relationship with Turkey. Three months afterwards the United States sanctioned PDVSA, a recently incorporated Turkish company, Grouping Iveex Insaat, started buying Venezuelan oil. In April of that year, the company, owned by Maduro's sometime Housing Minister, bought but under 8 percent of Venezuela'south total monthly oil exports.

Affairs

Erdogan has staunchly defended Maduro diplomatically on several occasions. The Turkish head of state does not recognize Guaidó as the interim president and has forcefully criticized U.Southward. sanctions against the government. During a press conference in Caracas last year, when asked nigh the countries' merchandise, Erdogan responded by asking, "Are we going to seek permission from somewhere almost whom we will exist friends with and with whom nosotros will merchandise?"

Turkey is arguably the most distinct of the five countries covered in this report. Importantly, it is the only ane of these countries that currently has a stiff bilateral human relationship with the United States. Indeed, Erdogan shares a strong personal relation with President Trump. Turkey is also a member state of NATO and could benefit from greater European support in some of its key strategic interests. Moreover, different Russia, China, Iran, and Cuba, Turkey's relationship with Venezuela is relatively new—it was cultivated by Maduro, not Chávez. Taking these factors into account, Turkey may represent an unexplored avenue for facilitating a democratic transition, and the United States and European Marriage should leverage their relationships with Turkey to pressure Erdogan regarding his back up of Maduro.

[Turkey] is the only one of these countries that currently has a strong bilateral human relationship with the U.s.a. .

Conclusion

It is important to underscore that Venezuela'south electric current state of collapse is commercially suboptimal for many of these allies. Cuba, for example, has experienced sporadic fuel and cooking gas shortages because of the crisis in Venezuela. Russia, which has been a partner to PDVSA for years, has notwithstanding to pause fifty-fifty on most of its energy investments. Communist china is still owed billions of dollars. And nonetheless, these states go on to support the Maduro government and its criminal enterprises, often to push back against U.S. interests in the region.

The Venezuelan interim government and its allies should continue pressuring the regime's "fabulous five," which have continued to help the Maduro regime evade sanctions, violate human rights, and profit from illicit activities. These alliances have distinct cultural, historical, and geopolitical nuances that should be more securely explored. A better understanding of how these countries support the Maduro government—and how far they are willing to go—may yield unexplored avenues for the interim government and its allies to find a peaceful autonomous solution.

Moises Rendon is director of the Hereafter of Venezuela Initiative and a fellow with the Americas Program at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Claudia Fernandez is a enquiry acquaintance with the Future of Venezuela Initiative.

The authors are grateful to CSIS Senior Adviser Ambassador William Brownfield, CSIS Senior Adviser Juan Cruz, CSIS Senior Acquaintance Bulent Aliriza, and Administrator Francisco Santos for providing valuable insights. The authors are as well grateful to Evan Ellis, CSIS Senior Associate, for contributing to this brief, and to Margarita R. Seminario, Deputy Director and Senior Fellow of the Americas Program, for reviewing a draft of this brief. The authors would also like to thank Estefania Perez Cuellar and Hector Correa for contributing to this brief.

Finally, the authors are grateful to the iDeas Lab for their work on this brief, especially Jeeah Lee, Katherine Stark, and Elizabeth Richardson.

This report is made possible by general support to CSIS. No direct sponsorship contributed to this report.

CSIS Briefs  are produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a private, tax-exempt establishment focusing on international public policy issues. Its enquiry is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not accept specific policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should exist understood to be solely those of the author(s).

© 2020 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.

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Source: https://www.csis.org/analysis/fabulous-five-how-foreign-actors-prop-maduro-regime-venezuela

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